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Abstract: American U.S. crude oil prices have dropped significantly of late down to a low of less than
$30 a barrel in early 2016. At the same time price volatility has increased and crude in storage has
reached record amounts in the U.S. America. Low oil prices in particular pose quite a challenge for the
survival of U.S. America’s tight-oil industry. In this paper we assess the current profitability and future
prospects of this industry. The question could be broadly stated as: should producers stop operation
immediately or continue in the hope that prices will rise in the medium term? Our assessment is
based on a stochastic volatility model with three risk factors, namely the oil spot price, the long-term
oil price, and the spot price volatility; we allow for these sources of risk to be correlated and display
mean reversion. We then use information from spot and futures West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
oil prices to estimate this model. Our aim is to show how the development of the oil price in the
future may affect the prospective revenues of firms and hence their operation decisions at present.
With the numerical estimates of the model’s parameters we can compute the value of an operating
tight-oil field over a certain time horizon. Thus, the present value (PV) of the prospective revenues
up to ten years from now is $37.07/bbl in the base case. Consequently, provided that the cost of
producing a barrel of oil is less than $37.07 production from an operating field would make economic
sense. Obviously this is just a point estimate. We further perform a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation to
derive the risk profile of this activity and calculate two standard measures of risk, namely the value
at risk (VaR) and the expected shortfall (ES) (for a given confidence level). In this sense, the PV of
the prospective revenues will fall below $22.22/bbl in the worst 5% of the cases; and the average
value across these worst scenarios is $19.77/bbl. Last we undertake two sensitivity analyses with
respect to the spot price and the long-term price. The former is shown to have a stronger impact on
the field’s value than the latter. This bodes well with the usual time profile of tight oil production:
intense depletion initially, followed by steep decline thereafter.
Keywords: tight oil; oil price; stochastic process; futures prices; Monte Carlo (MC) simulation;
risk profile; value at risk (VaR); expected shortfall (ES)
1. Introduction
Starting in the 1970s U.S. oil production has witnessed a long period of decline. This phase
came to an end in early 2008 [1]. As shown in Figure 1, from then on domestic oil production
increased significantly. This increase can be explained to a large extent by the exploitation of geological
formations that are characterized by low porosity and extremely low permeability [2–4]. In this
regard, tight oil is a broader term than shale oil in that it can be extracted from shale beds or other
low-permeability reservoirs (e.g., limestone, sandstone).
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Figure  1.  Monthly  production  and  rig  count  in  the  key  tight‐oil  U.S.  regions.  Source:  Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). 
Until  recently  production  of  these  diffuse,  unconventional  fossil  resources was  considered 
uneconomic,  but  the  successful  combination  of  horizontal  drilling  and  hydraulic  fracturing  (or 
fracking)  during  the  last decade  has  brought  vast  amounts  of  shale  gas  and  tight  oil  that were 
previously inaccessible within reach [5]. At the same time, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices 
were at relatively high levels; see Figure 2 (prices from the Intercontinental Exchange, ICE). 
 
Figure 2. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot and longest‐maturity futures prices. Source: EIA and 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), respectively. 
Figure 1. Monthly production and rig count in the key tight-oil U.S. regions. Source: Energy
Information Administration (EIA).
U til recently production of these diffuse, unconventional fossil resources was considered
uneconomic, but the succes ful combin tion of orizontal drilling and hydraulic frac uring (or fracking)
during the last decade has brought vast amounts of shale gas and tight oil that were previously
inaccessible within reach [5]. At the same time, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices were at
relatively high levels; see Figure 2 (prices from the Intercontinental Exchange, ICE).
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Note that the economics of tight oil production is different from that of conventional oil extraction:
(a) quick ramp-up periods that make it easier to meet expected increases in market demand; (b) small
upfront investment outlay; (c) high initial decline rates (65%–80% in first year); (d) low lifting costs;
and (e) only two-three years of hedge-ability are needed. Successful hedging in particular is vital to
mitigating falling prices [6].
Certainly, as both technology and operator experience mature tight oil can be extracted at
higher efficiency levels. Productivity improvements in turn imposed a downward pressure on the
wellhead break-even oil price, which has decreased by more than 40% across all main shale plays in
North America between 2013 and 2015 [7]. Nonetheless, in view of the decline in crude oil prices that
began in the summer of 2014, strong prices can no longer be taken for granted. In fact, now output has
begun to fall, especially among high-cost producers [8].
This paper focuses on the prospects for U.S. producers of tight oil. Their net income obviously
depends on both revenues and costs. It is hard to get good cost data. This is partly because of limited
information available about: (i) the rate at which tight-oil wells become less productive over time;
and (ii) the distribution of well productivity [9]. We pay special attention to revenues. From this
viewpoint, the future behavior of the crude oil price is paramount: it determines when production is
profitable [10].
Lower oil prices could be anticipated to negatively impact production rates [11]. Yet the effect on
the U.S. tight-oil sector has been far from immediate; see Figure 1. At the same time, the shale industry
is assumed to be able to increase production quickly, once it becomes profitable to do so. Therefore,
an eventual price recovery would likely promote the resumption of output from many areas [12].
Indeed, the curve of oil futures prices shows an increasing profile; see Figure 3. Thus, in principle
producers could wait for higher prices before resuming operations while selling their output at oil
prices above $40/bbl for future delivery (as of mid-May 2016 spot prices edged towards $50/bbl).
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The oil price above which tight-oil producers can resume drilling and make money again is a
crucial issue in this paper (similarly for the production cost below which operation is worthwhile).
This threshold or “break-even” level is not only paramount for the producers involved. Depending on
its level the consequences could be felt way beyond the shale beds and reach the whole economy as it
could fundamentally alter the entire dynamics of the oil market.
To our knowledge, there is no academic or scientific literature that addresses this specific issue.
The topic is pursued in several reports from industry outfits and government agencies. At this point,
however, an important remark is in order; it concerns the precise definition of the break-even itself.
For example, in [13] the break-even WTI price is defined as the price at which a producer will hit a
pre-specified after-tax internal rate of return (10% and 20%). The limitations and shortcomings of
the internal rate of return as an investment criterion are well known; see for instance [14]. And the
adoption of a particular target level (say, 20%) in the absence of a full-fledged valuation model is a
bit ad hoc. The break-even oil price is certainly the usual metrics for assessing profitability; see [9,15].
Similarly, all break-evens in [16] are calculated by finding the oil price that makes the net present
value (NPV) of the field equal to zero. The NPV strongly depends on the discount rate applied, which
reflects the oil firms’ profit requirements (a 10% rate is used). However, sometimes the break-even
cost is invoked too; see [17]. Our definition goes along this line: when addressing the valuation of an
operating tight-oil well, our “break-even” is the (unit) cost (here assumed deterministic) that makes
that specific well's NPV drop to zero as seen from today (see Section 5 below). Besides, since we adopt
risk-neutral valuation, the precise discount rate is hardly arbitrary: based on sound financial principles,
it must be the riskless interest rate.
In what follows we focus on operating wells. We leave aside the financial condition of tight-oil
producers, their levels of debt, whether they are cash strapped, etc. It may well be quite rational to
keep producing at oil prices below the break-even, for example to maintain cash flow and service debt,
or to avoid the costs associated with closure, financial distress costs, or others. Reference [18] considers
how companies are going to be able to implement strategies to address their debt loads.
We propose a model in which the spot price of oil evolves stochastically over time while displaying
mean reversion. The volatility of price changes is similarly assumed to be stochastic and mean reverting.
As for the long-term price (toward which the spot price tends to revert), in principle it can be correlated
with the spot price and, consequently, show mean reversion too. We then estimate the model with
daily prices of the ICE WTI Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures Contract traded on the ICE.
By drawing on futures prices we can undertake so-called risk-neutral valuation. Hence we develop
a model for the (gross) value of an operating tight-oil field (we restrict ourselves to considering cash
inflows); for convenience we express this value in per-unit terms, i.e., per barrel of initial reserves.
Our numerical parameter estimates are applied to this valuation model over a given time horizon
(10 years). Thus we can compute the present value (PV) of the revenues to be collected over the
valuation horizon. Interestingly this PV can be interpreted as a “trigger” or “break even” level for oil
producers: a cost (per barrel) above this cumulative inflow of cash will translate into a NPV with its
ensuing consequences. When we refer to costs we mean costs not incurred yet, i.e., the costs to be met
in the future. The point here is whether the oil company will make a profit by producing from now
onwards (this is the right approach even though the process as a whole from the beginning may be
unprofitable). In addition, we assess the (revenue) risk faced by these producers. Specifically, we run
a number of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to derive the probability distribution of the PV of an oil
well’s revenues. We synthesize this information into a pair of measures of risk, namely the value at
risk (VaR) and the expected shortfall (ES) for the standard confidence level (95%). We finally check the
robustness of our results with respect to changes in the spot price and the long-term future price.
The paper is organized as follows: after this Introduction, Section 2 develops the theoretical model
for crude oil price; our data sample is described in Section 3, followed by the econometric analysis
in Section 4; we then move to the valuation of a tight-oil field in Section 5; Section 6 presents our
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major results in terms of the revenue risk faced by U.S. producers; Section 7 includes some sensitivity
analyses; lastly, Section 8 presents our conclusions.
2. Stochastic Model for Crude Oil Price
Early analyses that considered oil price as a stochastic process adopted the geometric Brownian
motion (GBM); see for instance [19,20]. Subsequent one-factor diffusion models typically displayed
mean reversion, e.g., the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process in [21]. More sophisticated two- and three-factor
diffusion models can be found in [22–26], among others. In some of these models the commodity price
follows a standard GBM while the interest rate and/or the convenience yield show mean reversion.
Here we develop a stochastic model with three sources of risk. We consider a stochastic long-term
price alongside the spot price and the stochastic volatility. This is because the long-term price changes
over time and is a key factor for evaluating long-run investments and risks. Oil price tends toward
a long-term level that is determined by futures prices of contracts with distant maturities. And the
volatility of price changes is mean-reverting too. Specifically:
dSt = [k(Smt − St)− λSt]dt + σtStdW1 (1)
dS∗t = υS∗t dW2 (2)
dσt = ν (σ
∗ − σt)dt + σσtdW3 (3)
E(dW1, dW2) = ρ1,2dt ; E(dW
1, dW3) = ρ1,3dt ; E(dW
2, dW3) = ρ2,3dt (4)
We assume that the time-t (spot) crude oil price, St, evolves stochastically in the risk-neutral world
according to a mean-reverting process like the inhomogeneous (or integrated) geometric Brownian
motion, or IGBM for short ([27–30]). In Equation (1), Smt stands for the long-term equilibrium level
towards which St tends to revert in the physical, real world with the passage of time. k is the speed of
reversion; it determines how quickly the expected value of oil price E[St] approaches the long-term
equilibrium level. λ stands for the market price of risk. σt is the instantaneous volatility of oil
price changes. And dW1 = ε1t
√
dt is the increment to a standard Wiener process where ε1t : N(0, 1).
Equation (1) can be equivalently rewritten as:
dSt = (k + λ)(S∗t − St)dt + σtStdW1 (5)
Here, S∗t ≡ kS
m
t
k+λ denotes the corresponding long-term level in the risk neutral world (this applies
too in futures markets).
As shown in Equation (2), we assume that S∗t is not deterministic but changes stochastically,
unpredictably over time with instantaneous volatility υ. Though at time t we cannot predict its level
at a future date T, it can be proven that Et(S∗T) = S∗t , i.e., the expected value can be inferred from the
current curve of crude oil prices in the futures markets on any particular day (e.g., the last sample day).
Thus, what we know about S∗t is only its expected value and the volatility.
Regarding the IGBM in Equation (3), we further assume that oil price volatility σt displays mean
reversion. σ* denotes the long-term equilibrium level towards which σt tends to revert in the long term.
It does so at speed ν, which determines how fast E(σt) approaches σ*. And σ denotes a scaling factor
for the volatility. In the area of stochastic volatility models, the IGBM is called the GARCH diffusion
model in [31]. Indeed, the version of the IGBM process in discrete time is just the GARCH(1,1) model.
As for Equation (4), in principle the three stochastic processes can be correlated. Whether in
reality they are or not is an empirical issue. We will touch upon this issue in Section 4. At this point we
merely observe that the long-term price S∗t follows a random walk but, since it is correlated with St
(via ρ12), in practice it behaves as a mean-reverting process.
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Now, reference [32] shows that, in the risk-neutral world (under the equivalent martingale
measure or risk-neutral probability measure P), the time-t expected value of the spot price at T,
or equivalently the futures price for maturity T, is given by:
EPt (ST) = F(t, T) = S
∗
t + [St − S∗t ]e−(k+λ)(T−t) (6)
Note that the price change volatility σt has no impact on this expectation. A similar argument
can be made for the futures contract with the nearest maturity, T1, to estimate the futures price with
maturity T2:
F(t, T2) = S∗t + [F(t, T1)− S∗t ]e−(k+λ)(T2−T1) (7)
Equation (7) allows us to estimate daily values of S∗t ≡ kS
m
t
k+λ and k + λ from observed daily futures
prices by non-linear least squares. On the other hand, the long-term equilibrium level on the futures
market is given by:
F(t,∞) =
kSm
k + λ
≡ S∗t (8)
3. Sample Data
The ICE WTI Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures Contract is traded on the ICE, an electronic
marketplace. The contract size is 1000 barrels. The units of trading are any multiple of this amount.
The contracts listed cover up to 108 consecutive months. Prices are quoted in US dollars and cents.
The contract is settled in cash against the prevailing market price for US light sweet crude. Financial
performance of all ICE Futures Europe contracts are guaranteed by ICE Clear Europe provided they
are registered with it by its clearing Members. Note that oil futures prices can well be different in other
major markets, e.g., the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), but arbitrage-based arguments
pose severe restrictions on the potential price gaps; in other words, the differences in prices should
be small.
Our sample consists of 161,274 daily futures prices. The time span ranges from 24 February 2006
to 4 February 2016, i.e., almost ten years. We first classify the data according to the contract’s time
to maturity (T). Table 1 shows the number of observations and the return volatility of some futures
contracts in our sample.
Table 1. Volatility of some futures contracts according to their maturity.
Maturity # Observations Return Volatility
Nearest (1 month) 2571 0.3175
6 months 2571 0.2859
12 months 2571 0.2602
18 months 2571 0.2452
24 months 2571 0.2324
30 months 2548 0.2250
36 months 2420 0.2201
42 months 2246 0.2176
48 months 2189 0.2155
We can observe that futures contracts with longer times to expiration (T − t) display lower return
volatilities (this is the so-called Samuelson effect). Figure 4 displays this behavior. Consistent with this
pattern, as a particular contract approaches its maturity and T − t decreases (a leftward movement in
Figure 4) volatility increases and the futures price converges toward the spot price, so that F(T,T) = ST.
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4. Econometric Analysis
We initially compute the values of k + λ and S∗t (see Equations (1) and (5)) on each day using
non-linear least squares. Thus, for example, since we have 2571 prices of the nearest-to-maturity
futures contracts we estimate 2571 values for each parameter. We are interested in getting a numerical
estimate of the volatility υ in Equation (2). Nonetheless, a few outliers are identified in the original
time series of {S∗t }t≥0 so we filter them out following the procedure described in the Appendix A.
With the new, filtered series of long-term prices we calculate a volatility υ = 0.2477.
Regarding the spot price volatility σt (see Equations (1), (3) and (5)) we adopt the following
approach (the Appendix A sheds more light on this issue). We first note that it is not constant;
see Figure 5. Here, on any sample day we take the return on that particular day and those on the
previous 24 days. We compute the standard deviation over these 25 days. We then multiply this daily
volatility times the square root of 252 so as to get a yearly volatility.
Using the volatility series {σt}t≥0 calculated with a 25-day moving window we estimate the
following model:
σt+∆t − σt
σt
= −ν∆t + νσ∗∆t 1
σt
+ σ
√
∆tε3t (9)
We get ν = 1.3652, σ* = 0.3529, an σ 0.8638. Besides we compute σ0 = .8066.
Finally, the correlation parameters in E e estimated using the residuals from
estimating the discrete-time versions of ( )–(3), similar to the diff rential Equation (9).
Then we compute the correlation coefficients bet ee i i als series.
For convenience, Table 2 sho s t e erical estimates of the underlying parameters as of
4 February 2016 (the last day in the sa ple). The riskless rate r = 0.0225 corresponds to U.S. Treasury
10-year bonds in December 2015.
These correlations suggest that in practice we only have two correlated stochastic processes,
namely the spot price (with stochastic volatility) and the long-term price. The mean-reverting stochastic
volatility process in Equation (3) is almost uncorrelated with spot and long-term prices.
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Figure 5. WTI crude oil price volatility (25-day moving window).
Table 2. Parameter estimates as of the last sample day (4 February 2016).
Parameter Value Parameter Value
S0 ($/bbl) 31.36 ν 1.3652
Nearest futures σ* 0.3529
Contract: F(0,T1) ($/bbl) 31.72 σ 0.8638
k + λ 0.6824 ρ1,2 0.5085
S∗0 ($/bbl) 49.94 ρ1,3 0.0518
σ0 0.8066 ρ2,3 0.0115
υ 0.2477 r 0.0225
5. The Value of an Operating Tight-Oil Field
A field here is a production unit that drains one or more pools in a formation, with a defined
ownership. Let Q0 stand for a tight-oil field’s existing reserves today (t = 0). The cumulative oil
production up to time t in the future can been determined as:
Qt = Q0 −Q0e−η = Q0(1− e−ηt) (10)
where η denotes the average extraction rate from time 0 to t. For example, assume a decline rate of
72.5% in the first year (the average of the often-cited range 65%–80%). In other words, by the end of
the first year the volume of reserves has dropped to 27.5% of the initial level Q0. Since 0.275 = e−1.291
we thus have:
Qt = Q0(1− e−1.291t) (11)
Hence the instantenous change in production is given by:
dQt = ηQ0e−ηtdt (12)
Note that exponential decline implies that production will extend indefinitely into the future.
This possibility can be precluded by imposing an ad hoc minimum allowed (cut-off) production level,
or another one based on the economics of operation (fixed and varibale costs, oil price, etc.).
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On the other hand, the time-0 expectation of the spot price at t in the risk-neutral world (or under
the equivalent martingale probability measure P) is given by:
EP0 (St) = S
∗
0 + [S0 − S∗0 ]e−(k+λ)t (13)
Now we can calculate the (time-0) expected PV of the (cumulative) cash inflow or revenue to an
operating tight-oil field since the start of depletion (at t = 0) until time t. Let I(S0, S∗0 , t) denote the
expected PV (as seen from today t = 0) of this uncertain income up to time t. Then:
I(S0, S∗0 , t) =
∫ t
0
[S∗0 + (S0 − S∗0)e−(k+λ)t]ηQ0e−(η+r)tdt (14)
I(S0, S∗0 , t) = ηQ0
∫ t
0
S∗0e−(η+r)tdt + ηQ0
∫ t
0
(S0 − S∗0)e−(k+λ+η+r)tdt (15)
I(S0, S∗0 , t) =
ηQ0S∗0
η+ r
[1− e−(η+r)t] + ηQ0(S0 − S
∗
0)
k + λ+ η+ r
[1− e−(k+λ+η+r)t] (16)
As we look arbitrarily far into the future ( t→ ∞ ) the expected PV of the cumulative
revenue approaches:
I(S0, S∗0 ,∞) =
ηQ0S∗0
η+ r
+
ηQ0(S0 − S∗0)
k + λ+ η+ r
(17)
For the sake of convenience we compute this expected PV in unit terms, i.e., per barrel of remaining
reserves (Q0). We adopt lower case for denoting “unit” measures:
i(S0, S∗0 , t) ≡
I(S0, S∗0 , t)
Q0
=
ηS∗0
η+ r
[1− e−(η+r)t] + η(S0 − S
∗
0)
k + λ+ η+ r
[1− e−(k+λ+η+r)t] (18)
Now, relevant costs to producing oil are typically split between capital expenses and operating
expenses. The former include all development costs related to facilities and drilling of wells. The latter
include all costs related to running the operations (they would drop to zero if acitivities were
interrupted). We assume that producing a single barrel of oil entails a constant, all-encompassing
cost c. The (unit) NPV of a tight-oil field will thus be:
NPV(S0, S∗0 , t, c) = i(S0, S∗0 , t)− c (19)
Using Equation (17) along with the parameter values in Table 2 and setting t = 10 allow to compute
NPV(S0, S∗0 , 10, c) = 37.07− c. The net result will be positive provided c < $37.07/bbl. This break-even
cost is higher than the spot price S0 = $31.36/bbl in Figure 3. This is due to the increasing price curve
on the futures market, where the oil can be sold in advance for delivery in the future. In particular, this
result is contingent on the initial spot price and the initial estimate of the long-term price. In our case,
both take on values at the lower end of the observed range; for one, as of mid-May 2016 the spot price
hovered around $47/bbl. The sensitivity analyses in Section 7 below account for these issues.
As for the threshold $37.07/bbl as such, reference [17] suggests that 18 counties in the Permian
basin have break-even costs in the low-to-mid $40/bbl range. On the other hand, reference [6] reports
on the break-even oil price for some Permian basin-based horizontal wells operated by selected
companies. Several of them are reported to have break-even prices below $40/bbl. EOG’s latest wells
in particular exhibit as low a break-even price as $27/bbl.
In our base case, S0 = $31.36/bbl, and S∗0 = $49.94/bbl; the resulting PV of cumulative revenue is
$37.07/bbl. This number fits between 36.21 and 37.82 in Table 3 for S∗0 = 50 when S0 equals 30.00 and
32.50, respectively. As expected, the higher the initial spot price and the long-term equilibrium price
the higher the PV of the cumulative unit (i.e., per barrel) cash inflow. Yet their relative importance is
far from symmetric. For example, taking S∗0 = 45 as given, the change in S0 from $45/bbl to $50/bbl
induces an increase in i(S0, S∗0 , 10) from $44.23/bbl to $47.46/bbl, i.e., a 7.3% growth. However, if we
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instead take S0 = 45 as given and change S∗0 from $45/bbl to $50/bbl, this induces an increase in
i(S0, S∗0 , 10) from $44.23/bbl to $45.91/bbl, i.e., a 3.8% growth. The primacy of the present (and the
immediate future) relative to the more distant future bodes well with the production of tight oil,
which is characterized by very high initial extraction rates.
Table 3. Present value (PV) of cumulative 10-year revenue per barrel of initial reserves, i(S0, S∗0 , 10).
S0|S∗0 45.00 47.50 50.00 52.50 55.00 57.50 60.00 62.50 65.00
20.00 28.06 28.90 29.74 30.58 31.42 32.26 33.10 33.94 34.78
22.50 29.68 30.52 31.36 32.20 33.04 33.88 34.72 35.56 36.40
25.00 31.29 32.13 32.97 33.81 34.65 35.49 36.33 37.17 38.01
27.50 32.91 33.75 34.59 35.43 36.27 37.11 37.95 38.79 39.63
30.00 34.53 35.37 36.21 37.05 37.89 38.73 39.57 40.41 41.25
32.50 36.14 36.98 37.82 38.66 39.50 40.34 41.18 42.02 42.86
35.00 37.76 38.60 39.44 40.28 41.12 41.96 42.80 43.64 44.48
37.50 39.38 40.22 41.06 41.90 42.74 43.58 44.42 45.26 46.10
40.00 40.99 41.84 42.68 43.52 44.36 45.20 46.04 46.88 47.72
42.50 42.61 43.45 44.29 45.13 45.97 46.81 47.65 48.49 49.33
45.00 44.23 45.07 45.91 46.75 47.59 48.43 49.27 50.11 50.95
47.50 45.85 46.69 47.53 48.37 49.21 50.05 50.89 51.73 52.57
50.00 47.46 48.30 49.14 49.98 50.82 51.66 52.50 53.34 54.18
These figures can be interpreted as break-even costs under the NPV criterion (with hedging on
the futures market): for any particular price pair (S0, S∗0), a unit cost c above i(S0, S∗0 , 10) will translate
into a negative NPV. Unprofitable tight-oil fields (whether in operation or mothballed) should be
abandoned immediately unless abandonment costs are sizeable and justify postponing this decision in
the short term. Needless to say, if production costs were known then we could set S0 at a given level
and compute the price S∗0 that makes NPV = 0 (or, given S∗0 , calculate S0 such that NPV = 0), i.e., one
can find a break-even oil price.
6. An Assessment of Risk
We have just mentioned that there is a real risk of some fields becoming uneconomic to run.
A good grasp of the potential scenarios thus seems advisable. With this purpose in mind we run
500,000 MC simulations to obtain the probability distribution of i(S0, S∗0 , t) under the assumption of
no hedging activities on the futures market. We divide each random path into time steps of length
∆t = 1/50 (i.e., almost weekly steps) and calculate the corresponding spot prices, long-term prices and
volatilities using the following discrete-time scheme:
∆St = (k + λ)(S∗t − St)∆t + σtSt
√
∆tε1t (20)
∆S∗t = υS∗t
√
∆t
[
ρ1,2ε
1
t + ε
2
t
√
1− ρ21,2
]
(21)
∆σt = ν (σ
∗ − σt)∆t + σσt
√
∆t
ε1t ρ1,3 + ε2t ρ2,3 − ρ1,2ρ1,3√
1− ρ21,2
+ ε3t
√√√√√1− ρ21,3 − (ρ 2,3 − ρ1,3ρ1,2
)2
1− ρ21,2
 (22)
where ε1t , ε
2
t and ε
3
t are independent and identically distributed samples from a univariate N(0,1)
distribution. The time horizon considered is 10 years, so each run comprises 500 steps.
Considering the average decline rate (72.5%), the production rate at an operating field over
period ∆t (per barrel of initial reserves, and denoted again in lower case) equals:
∆qt ≡ dQtQ0 = 1.291e
−1.291t∆t (23)
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Hence the PV of the total (unit) cash inflow along the j-th path, ij, is given by:
ij =
t=500
∑
t=1
Sjt∆qte−rt = 1.291
t=500
∑
t=1
Sjte−(1.291+r)t (24)
And the average income across all of the simulation runs is:
i =
j=500,000
∑
j=1
ij
500, 000
(25)
The results are displayed in Figure 6; they draw on the parameter estimates in Table 2. The average
of our MC simulations is $37.18/bbl; this figure differs only slightly (0.3%) from the analytical value
i(S0, S∗0 , 10) = 37.07 that resulted from Equation (17).
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Figure 6. Probability distribution of the PV of income from tight oil ($/bbl).
Now, the so-called VaR addresses the question of how much a company could deviate from its
average or expected performance (on the downside) with a given confidence level. In our case, the
VaR(95%) is $22.22/bbl. This means that i(S0, S∗0 , 10) will fall below 22.22 in the worst 5% of the cases.
e istri ti i Figure 6 is far from sy metric (unlike a Gaussian distribution). Besides,
f t tails r other deviations from normality cannot be discarded. For this reason, in iti t t e
e st r e s re f risk e compute the so-called ES, or ES(95%), which is more sensitive
to the shape of the loss tail. It measures the average value of i(S0, S∗0 , 10) in the 5 of orst cases:
$19.77/bbl. This value is close to the cost of producing oil in the best Saudi Arabian fields. In the case
of U.S. tight-oil producers, costs are higher, so their NPV will certainly be negative more than 5% of
the cases.
Figure 7 below shows the average NPV (per barrel of reserves), NPV, along with the VaR and the
ES as a function of the (unit) production cost of tight oil, c. Equation (19) above shows a linear, negative
relationship between the NPV and c; therefore, the NPV is represented by a downward-sloping straight
line in this space. The same holds for VaR(95%) and ES(95%). The NPV is positive whenever the cost is
lower than $37.18/bbl. Looking beyond central moments, the 5% worst-case scenarios start at a cost of
$22.22/bbl. In other words, if the oil field’s cumulative income falls to the VaR(95%) level then a cost
of $22.22/bbl implies NPV = 0. Within this region the average revenue is $19.77/bbl, so a unit cost
above 19.77 pushes the average NPV into negative territory.
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Figure 7. Unit net present value (NPV) (average), value at risk (VaR), and expected shortfall (ES) as a
function of unit production costs.
On the other and up to now we have adopted th standar worst-case threshold lev l for
both the VaR and the ES, namely 5%. Nonetheless, we can be interested in the impact of even
more stringent scenarios on oil producers’ revenues. Figure 8 displays how our earlier thresholds
($22.22/bbl and 19.77, respectively) change as we look at ever worse scenarios. Not surprisingly,
the PV of the cumulative cash inflow along the left tail of the distribution decreases. The most extreme
scenario considered (1%) entails a drop in the VaR and ES of cumulative revenue around 20% relative
to the traditional thresholds.
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7. Sensitivity Analysis
The above numerical results are obviously contingent on the particular sample period considered
(from 24 February 2006 to 4 February 2016). In the final part of this period the oil price was
abnormally subdued, at some points swinging around $30 a barrel. Our estimates of S0 and S∗0
($31.36/bbl and $49.94/bbl, respectively) emerge from these futures prices. Below we perform some
sensitivity analyses with respect to changes in the spot price and the long-term price. As before, we are
interested in the impact on the risk profile of cumulative revenues and the two measures or risk.
We consider four potential values of S0 (namely $20, $30, $40, and $50 per barrel) and combine
them with three values of S∗0 ($40, $50, and $60 per barrel). The latter values can be seen as conservative
when compared with other sources. For example [13], analyzes two different scenarios in which oil
prices rise back to either $70/bbl or $90/bbl. Note, though, that we are focusing on the risks faced
by current tight-oil producers. Our prices are not meant to be required for luring capital back in or
incentivizing new, long-term investments at the global level. Our price levels are more in line with one
of the forecasts in [12], where crude prices are assumed to rebound to $60–$65 a barrel for an extended
period and rigs continue in operation (or drillers put them back to work).
Table 4 shows the results. The reference case (S0 = $31.36/bbl, and S∗0 = $49.94/bbl) is well
represented by the central line in the second block (S0 = $30/bbl, and S∗0 = $50/bbl). Now, let us
set the long-term price at $50/bbl while changing the initial spot price from $40/bbl to $50/bbl
(a 25% increase). In this case, the PV of the cumulative revenue jumps from $42.75/bbl to $49.15/bbl,
an increase of 15%. Our two measures of risk increase too, although at a slightly lower rate
(around 13%). Therefore, the unit cost required for turning the NPV to negative rises significantly and
the prospects for oil producers improve accordingly. We can adopt another perspective on this issue.
Specifically, now we fix S0 at $50/bbl and change S∗0 from $40/bbl to $50/bbl (again a 25% increase).
In this case, i(S0, S∗0 , 10)* grows by 7.5% (from $45.73/bbl to $49.15/bbl) and our variables of interest
grow around 9%. As in Section 5, i(S0, S∗0 , 10) is relatively more affected by changes in the spot price
than the future price; this is consistent with intense depletion at the beginning followed by a steep
decline thereafter.
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis.
S0 S∗0 Average i(S0,S∗0 , 10) VaR(95%) ES(95%)
20.00 40.00 26.51 16.02 14.27
20.00 50.00 29.93 18.26 16.28
20.00 60.00 33.36 20.48 18.27
30.00 40.00 32.91 19.49 17.31
30.00 50.00 36.34 21.77 19.37
30.00 60.00 39.76 24.04 21.41
40.00 40.00 39.32 22.89 20.27
40.00 50.00 42.75 25.22 22.38
40.00 60.00 46.17 27.50 24.46
50.00 40.00 45.73 26.26 23.20
50.00 50.00 49.15 28.61 25.34
50.00 60.00 52.58 30.94 27.45
The particular changes in our measures of risk are displayed in Figure 9. The starting level of
the 5% left tail, VaR(95%), is naturally higher than the average value over that tail, ES(95%), so the
former always evolves above the latter. This said, their respective behaviors are pretty much parallel.
For a given level of one price, a higher level of the other price entails an increase in both statistical
measures (and, consequently, a higher unit cost required to turn operations uneconomic). At the same
time, the sensitivity of these measures to both prices is more or less balanced.
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8. Conclusions 
This paper addresses the prospects for U.S. producers of tight oil with a special focus on their 
revenues.  The  behavior  of  the  oil  price  in  the  future  is  paramount  since  it  determines whether 
production is profitable or not. We introduce a stochastic model for the spot price of oil that allows 
for mean reversion. The long‐run level toward which the spot price tends to revert is itself stochastic. 
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three  processes  can well  be  correlated. Hence we  develop  a model  for  the  (gross)  value  of  an 
operating  tight‐oil  field. Specifically we compute  the PV of  the  revenues  to be collected over  the 
production/valuation  horizon;  for  convenience  we  measure  it  in  unit  terms  (i.e.,  per  barrel  of 
reserves).  This  PV  of  cumulative  revenues  can  be  set  against  the  PV  of  the  costs  (per  barrel  of 
reserves) to be faced in the future. Producers would make a profit or a loss depending on whether 
the resulting NPV is positive or not. 
We  estimate  the model with  daily  prices  of  the  ICE  WTI  Light  Sweet  Crude  Oil  Futures 
Contract  traded  on  the  ICE.  The  sample  period  goes  from  February  2006  to  February  2016. 
According to our results, the PV of the prospective revenues up to ten years from now amounts to 
$37.07/bbl  in  the  base  case.  Thus,  production  from  an  operating  tight‐oil  field will make  sense 
provided the cost of producing a barrel of oil is lower than $37.07. Needless to say, any numerical 
estimate must be  taken as  (more or  less) accurate on average at best,  if only because  the  tight‐oil 
sector is rather heterogeneous. 
This  threshold  is  contingent  on  the  initial  spot  price  of  oil  and  the  initial  estimate  of  the 
long‐term price (which were both relatively low even by current standards). Not surprisingly, if both 
prices increase, the PV of the cumulative cash inflow will increase too. Yet their relative importance 
is far from symmetric; in particular, the former has a stronger impact. Anyway the bottom line is that 
the paper shows how the extraction decision draws on spot and futures prices. 
In addition, we ran a MC simulation  to get a deeper knowledge of  the underlying risks and 
check the robustness of our results. The VaR measures how much a company could deviate from its 
average or expected performance (on the downside) with a given confidence level. In our case, the 
VaR(95%) is $22.22/bbl. This means that the PV of the cumulative revenue (per barrel) will fall below 
$22.22  in the worst 5% of the cases. We also compute the so‐called ES, or ES(95%), which is more 
sensitive to the shape of the loss tail. It measures the average value of the former PV in the 5% of 
worst scenarios; in our case it is $19.77/bbl. Further, when the worst‐case threshold is reduced from 
5% to 1% both the VaR and the ES of cumulative revenue decrease by around 20% relative to the 
earlier levels. Overall, the paper shows how to compute the risks underlying the decision to operate 
a  tight‐oil  field. This decision must be  re‐evaluated continuously as new  information arrives and 
( ) t t t ri ( 0 S∗0 ).
8. l i
This paper ad resses t e ros ects for .S. pro cers f tig t oil it a special foc s on their
reven es. i t f t is para o t since it deter ines hether
production fi l or not. We introduce a stochastic model for the spot price of oil that
allows for m an reversion. The long-run level toward which the spot price tends to r ver is it elf
stochastic. And the volat lity of price changes is similarly assumed to be stochastic and mean reverting.
T es three processes can well be correlated. Hence we develop a model for the (gross) value of
an operating tight-oil field. Specifically we compute the PV of the revenues t the
production/ l ation horizon; for conveni ce we m asure it in unit terms (i. ., per barrel of rese ves).
This PV of cumulative revenues can b set agai st the PV of the costs (per barrel of reserves) to be
faced in the future. Produc rs would make a profit or a loss de ending on whether the resulting NPV
is positive or not.
e estimate the model with daily prices of the ICE WTI Light Sweet Crud Oil Futures Con ract
traded on he ICE. The sample period goes from February 2006 to February 2 16. According to our
results, the PV of the prospective revenues up to t n years from n w amounts to $37.07/bbl i the
base case. Thus, production from an opera ng tight-oil field will make sense provided the cost of
producing a barrel of oil is lower than $37.07. Need ess to say, any numerical timate must be tak n as
(more or less) accur te on averag at b st, if only b cause the tight-oil sector is rather heterogeneous.
This threshold is contingent on the initial spot price of oil and the initial estimate of the long-term
price (whic were both relatively low ev n by current standards). Not surprisingly, if bo h prices
increase, the PV of the cumulative cash inflow will increase too. Yet their relative importance is far
from ymmetric; in particular, the former h s a str nger impact. Anyway he bottom line is that the
paper shows how the extraction decision draws on spot a d futures prices.
In addition, we ran a MC s mulation to get a deeper knowledg of th underlying risks and
check the robustness of our results. The VaR measures how much a company coul deviate from its
average or expected performance (on the downside) with a given confidence level. In our case, the
VaR(95%) is $22.22/bbl. This means that the PV of the cumulati e reve ue (per barrel) will fall b low
$22.22 in the worst 5% of the case . We also compute the so-called ES, or ES(95%), which is more
sensitive to the shape of the loss t il. It m asures the averag value of the former PV in the 5% of worst
sce ar os; in our case it is $19.77/bbl. Further, wh n t worst-case thr shold is reduced from 5% to 1%
both the VaR and the ES of cumulative revenue decrease by around 20% relative to the earlier levels.
Overall, the paper shows how to compute the risks und rlying the decision t operate a tight-oil field.
This decision must be re-evaluated c ntinuously as new information arrives and unc rtainty ab ut the
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future unfolds. For example, it can be rational to interrupt the operation of a previously profitable
field if an abrupt, unexpected fall in oil prices renders it unprofitable.
As already mentioned, our above numerical results are contingent on our particular sample
period. This is why we have also performed some sensitivity analyses with respect to changes in the
spot price and the long-term price. Thus, for example, we fix the long-run oil price at $50/bbl while
changing the initial spot price from $40 to $50 per barrel (a 25% increase). In this case, the PV of the
cumulative revenue increases by 15%, and our two measures of risk increase around 13%. Alternatively,
we can fix the initial spot price at $50/bbl and change the long-run price from $40 to $50 per barrel
(again a 25% increase). In this case, the PV of the cumulative revenue grows by 7.5% while our two
measures of risk grow around 9%. This stronger reaction to immediate events bodes will with the time
profile of production of tight oil: intense depletion initially, followed by steep decline thereafter.
At this point some qualifications are in order. Oil prices in particular can be anticipated to
remain low for a while [12]. Storage tanks in the U.S. are at their fullest since 1930. The fracklog,
i.e., the number of wells waiting to be hydraulically fractured, has grown threefold: firms naturally aim
to avoid oil extraction when the oil price is low, and defer completion work accordingly. The fracklog
may slow a recovery in oil prices, as companies opt to bring back shale where the lead times are short
and oil production can be quickly ramped-up to maximum levels.
In our analysis production costs are assumed deterministic and exogenously given. In particular
they are independent of oil price. But if oil prices eventually increase, maybe costs will follow suit
(cost cycling).
We have made no mention of taxes. However, governments extract money from oil companies
through a range of levies, royalties, severance taxes, production sharing agreements, etc.; see for
instance [33]. As a matter of fact, most shale resources do not lie beneath federal land. Reference [9]
estimates that federal royalties from these resources will total about $300 M a year by 2024. Therefore,
states (and lower-level authorities) have a great say on the prospects for shale producers, e.g., via oil
severance taxes, but also through tax incentives (such as credits or lower rates) when oil prices are low.
Nonetheless, federal authorities can still affect shale development in a number of ways, e.g., through
oil export policies, climate and environmental regulation, infrastructure development programs, etc.
We have left aside the decision whether to complete a DUC or not (exploration costs are already
sunk). This is clearly a real option that oil managers have at their disposal. Some other options
(similarly beyond the scope of this paper) refer to the possibility of temporarily closing in an active
well, or abandoning it completely, drilling a new well, and so on. Paying attention to option-like
issues is precisely one of the major approaches to raising the productivity of capital in this extremely
capital-intensive industry; see [6].
Last, as [34] points out, the terms of oil and gas leases have both individual and collective
significance since they specify a range of practices which can influence social, economic and/or
environmental outcomes of development. In our case, the pairing of horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing comes with a broader suit of spatial impacts [35]. These impacts should ultimately be
considered alongside regional and global benefits.
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Appendix A
We initially compute the values of k + λ and S* on each day using non-linear least squares;
see Equation (7). Our sample covers around 2500 trading days. Every day we know the futures price
for all the maturities available on that day (i.e., the curve of futures prices). Thus, for example, since
we have 2571 prices of the nearest-to-maturity futures contracts we estimate 2571 daily values of k + λ
and S*.
A few outliers are identified in the original time series of {S∗t }t≥0. Basically we are going to
replace those “atypical” estimates with observed prices of the futures contract with the longest
maturity (denoted Lt). The term “outliers” here means that those estimates fall beyond three times the
standard deviation of the {Lt}t≥0 series (on both sides). Our filtering process is very specific in that it is
applied to futures markets with long maturities where the aim is to compute a long-term equilibrium
price on a daily basis. Yet it is relatively intuitive and simple. We are not aware of any similar filtering
process in the related literature. The detailed procedure is as follows.
We start from the daily series of futures contracts with the longest maturity, Lt. As before, we adopt
the following continuous-time IGBM process:
dLt = θ(L∗ − Lt)dt +ωLtdW4 (A1)
Nonetheless, for estimation purposes we use the following discrete-time approximation:
Lt+∆t − Lt
Lt
= −θ∆t + θL∗∆t 1
Lt
+ω
√
∆tε4t (A2)
Equation (A2) allows us to calculate the volatility of the time series {Lt}t≥0: ω = 0.2028.
This volatility is our basis for identifying the outliers. We keep the original values of {S∗t }t≥0 provided
they fall within the interval:
−3ω√
252
≤ S
∗
t+∆t − S∗t
S∗t
≤ +3ω√
252
(A3)
In the case of the outliers, we replace the original value of S∗t+∆t with that of the futures contract
with the longest maturity c. With this particular series of values we now calculate a volatility of the
filtered series which is υ = 0.2436.
Last, as mentioned in Section 4, we make some further comments on the spot price volatility
(assuming it is constant, which is not). Given a time series of crude (WTI) oil spot prices St at time
intervals ∆t the standard return on the commodity price is easily calculated as:
Rt =
St+∆t − St
St
(A4)
The historical return volatility, which draws on past movements in the price of the underlying
asset, can be computed as follows:
σ∆t =
√√√√ 1
∆t(n−)1
t=n
∑
t=1
(Rt − R)2 (A5)
where R stands for the average or mean return. This estimate of volatility clearly depends on the
length of the time interval ∆t. It is customary to work with yearly volatility figures, so we adopt the
following transformation:
σ =
σ∆t√
∆t
(A6)
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Assuming there are 252 trading days in a year (i.e., ∆t = 1/252) the annual volatility σ is given by:
σ = σ∆t
√
252 (A7)
Applying this method to the spot price data in our sample yields σ = 0.3887.
Alternatively, it is also possible to calculate σ by using the residuals from estimating the
discrete-time approximation of Equation (1) in the physical, real world (i.e., without any adjustment
for risk and consequently no λSt term):
St+∆t − St
St
= −k∆t + k Sm
St
∆t + σ
√
∆tεt (A8)
The residuals from this difference equation yield σ = 0.3885. The difference between the two
approaches is thus negligible. Remember, nonetheless, that the spot price volatility is not constant as
seen in Figure 5.
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